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I.

THE RISE OF MASS RESTITUTION

Over the past decade, restitution has become an increasingly powerful tool
for framing and resolving a number of highly politicized "mass" wrongs.
Restitution - whose definition is not without controversy - has for centuries
stood for "the obligation to account for certain benefits (though not others)
obtained at the expense of another party." 1 Typically, those parties might have
been one party who mistakenly received a payment and the second party for
whom the payment was intended,2 or one party who wrote a book that violated
a confidentiality agreement and the second party with whom that agreement
was signed. 3 These cases often involved direct, bipolar disputes that
• Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I am grateful for the many useful comments I
received on this paper from the participants of the symposium, "The Jurisprudence of
Slavery Reparations," at the Boston University School of Law. I would like to note the
contributions of my two symposium co-organizers, Hanoch Dagan and Keith Hylton.
Invaluable research assistance was provided by Simon Lee, Brooklyn Law School, Class of
2006. All errors remain my own responsibility. This research was supported by a Summer
Research Grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1 Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1995)
[hereinafter Rationalizing Restitution].
2
See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Warner, 449 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)
(requiring restitution from a woman in whose account a check for $23,000 was mistakenly
deposited and who subsequently wrote checks drawing on the account); see also Andrew
Kull, Defenses To Restitution: The Bona Fide Creditor, 81 B.U. L. REv. 919, 920 (2001)
(discussing the merits of a restitution claim based on mistaken payment).
3
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 523 (1980) (holding that a former CIA agent
breached his fiduciary obligation to the U.S. Government by publishing a book in violation
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overlapped with contract and property disputes, although it has been noted that
restitution currently lacks the doctrinal coherence found in other areas of
private law. 4
In the 1990s, two very different strands of cases came together that
confirmed restitution's potential for forcing powerful corporate defendants to
acknowledge - or at least address - their past actions. One line of cases
involved suits by Holocaust survivors and others forced into slavery by the
Nazi government for the restitution of property that had unjustly enriched
contemporary corporations and banks. 5 The other line of cases involved suits
by forty-six states against the tobacco industry for restitution of funds that the
industry acquired unjustly because the states, it was argued, had paid for health
care costs that should have been borne by the industry. 6
Both the Holocaust and tobacco liti$ation are examples of a phenomenon I
have described elsewhere under the rubric of "mass restitution. " 7 The basic
definition of a mass restitution claim is that it is a suit for restitution brought
against a private party (usually a corporation) for the monetary equivalent of
property or labor taken from a large number of people during a period when
the wrongdoing leading to the unjust enrichment was accepted by the society
in which it occurred (or at least by those who controlled that society). A
further feature of the mass restitution suits is that they are a result of a change
in attitudes within society itself - not only is the earlier period recognized as
wrong, but it is viewed as a period of great wrongdoing that was made possible
because of the breakdown of the political system, a fact which helps justify, in
the eyes of later generations, the use oflaw.
A.

Holocaust Litigation

The Holocaust mass restitution litigation came about incrementally, each
stage building on the last. The first wave of litigation began in the United
States with the filing of a class action lawsuit naming a number of Swiss banks
as defendants in 1996.8 The class plaintiffs claimed the Swiss banks were
of an agreement requiring pre-publication clearance and requiring that the profits derived
thereby be held in constructive trust to avoid the unjust enrichment of the author).
4
See Rationalizing Restitution, supra note 1, at 1194-95 (discussing the adverse
consequences of the lack of certainty over the doctrine of restitution). Kull goes further:
"To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law professors included) do not
know what restitution is." Id. at 1195; see also Doug Rendleman, Common law Restitution
in the Mississippi Tobacco Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes?, 33 GA. L. REv.
847, 892 (1999) (quoting Kull and describing the law ofrestitution as a lost art).
5 See irifra notes 9-34 and accompanying text.
6
See irifra notes 35-65 and accompanying text.
7 See Anthony Sebok, A Brief History of Mass Restitution Litigation in the United States,
in CALLING POWER To ACCOUNT: LAW 'S RESPONSE To PAST INJUSTICE (D. Dyzenhaus & M.
Moran eds., forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter A Brief History] (manuscript on file with
author).
8
See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
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holding thousands, perhaps even tens of thousands, of "dormant accounts" that
the banks knew belonged to Jews killed in the Holocaust, and which the banks
were wrongfully withholding from the heirs of the account-holders. 9 Soon,
other plaintiffs filed suits and the grounds for the suits widened. 10 The
plaintiffs claimed that the Nazis looted property, including gold from the
bodies of Holocaust victims, and sold it to the Swiss banks during the war. The
Plaintiffs also claimed that the profits of slave labor were similarly "laundered"
through the Swiss banks, and that by actively cooperating with the Nazi
regime, the banks aided and abetted human rights violations including slave
labor and genocide. 11
The Swiss bank cases illustrate how fluid the concept of unjust enrichment
can be in a claim involving massive and systemic human rights violations. The
central claim was that the banks took money and never returned it. 12 The heart
of the cases was, therefore, the 'dormant accounts' themselves. Further claims
concerning property that the Nazis took and transferred to the Swiss banks
were an extension of the dormant account claim - the wrong at issue was the
wrongful possession of someone else's property. These claims were
essentially actions for restitution based in replevin, in which the banks held the
proceeds of the wrongfully taken property in constructive trust on behalf of the
accounts' true owners. 13
The Swiss bank cases also included some claims for restitution of the value
of slave labor itself: 14 and the settlement of the cases ultimately included a
component of compensation for this slave labor. 15 Technically, these were
claims for quantum meruit, or the value of plaintiffs' labor that unjustly
enriched the defendants. 16 Such actions stood on a footing of restitution rather
than replevin, in part because the claims were not for the return of anything to
(determining the fairness of a settlement agreement settling class action lawsuits brought by
Holocaust survivors).
9
Id. at 157.
10
Id. at 141-42.
11
Id. In 1998, the banks and the plaintiffs settled the suit for $1 .25 billion. The
settlement, which Judge Edward Korman approved, created a fund which allowed "Victims
or Targets of Nazi Persecution" to collect some form of reparations. The claimants included
those who could prove that they or their families had deposited assets with the banks. The
settlement also included payments of between $500 to $1500 to claimants who could prove
they were forced to perform slave labor for the Nazis, and $145 million to existing charities
to provide reparations to the community of victims for the looted property that had been
laundered through the banks. Id. at 142-43.
12 Id. at 151 (recounting the findings of the Volcker committee, which determined "that
approximately 54,000 Swiss bank accounts appear[ed] to have a 'probable' or 'possible'
connection to a Holocaust victim").
13 See DAN B. DoBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES§ 4.2(2) (2d ed. 1993).
14
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 141.
15 Id. at 148.
16
See DOBBS, supra note 13, § 4.2(3).
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which the plaintiffs had title. Rather, the plaintiffs asked the court to use its
equitable powers to remedy a wrong that resulted in the defendants' unjust
enrichment. 17
In 1998, many of the same lawyers who were handling the Swiss Bank
litigation initiated a new set of lawsuits demanding reparations for victims of
Nazi activities. 18 They filed these suits against corporations that used slave
labor during World War 11. 19 The legal claims were both similar to, and quite
different from, the Swiss Bank claims. They were similar in that they focused
on private corporations that had taken advantage of the horrible acts of the
Nazi government. For example, the first such lawsuit was against an American
company, Ford, on the theory that Ford's German subsidiary benefited from
slave labor organized by the Nazis with Ford's cooperation. 2 Following the
Ford lawsuit, fifty-six more lawsuits were filed in California, Illinois, Indiana,
New Jersey, and New York. 21 They differed from the Swiss Bank lawsuits in
that any connection with real property was now almost completely forgotten.
These new lawsuits were not for replevin (the defendant firms never received
any real property) but for quantum meruit (the labor taken and, more
importantly, the profit created through that labor). 22
As with the Swiss bank cases, the defendant firms mounted a defense based
on numerous technical objections. These defenses fell primarily into two
classes. The first might be described as the "political question" defense claiming that the reparations claims arose as result of activities by Germans
while Germany was at war with the United States; therefore, the claims were,
for purposes of American jurisdiction at least, subsumed under the Executive's
power to make and en.force treaties. 23 The defendant firms' second defense

°

17

At an earlier time, these claims would have been made in assumpsit. "Restitution at
law proceeded mainly in two large streams. The first dealt with cases in which plaintiff had
legal title . . . . [The second] derived from the writ of assumpsit. This kind of claim dealt
with cases in which the plaintiff could not assert title . . .. " Id. § 4 .2(1) (emphasis in
original).
18
Compare In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 139 with lwanowa v.
Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 424 (D.N.J. 1999). Professor Burt Neuborne at New
York University Law School has played a particularly active role in lawsuits seeking
reparations for forced labor during World War II. See MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST
JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR RESTITUTION IN AMERICA'S COURTS 59 (2003).
19
See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F . Supp. 2d at 433-34 (recounting how Ford, operating through
Ford Werke, employed slave labor in Germany during World War II).
20
Id. at 445 ( describing the plaintiffs' allegation that Ford was a de facto state actor).
21
BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 64-65 (discussing lawsuits against German and Austrian
companies for employing "slave labor during World War II").
22
See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 252-53 (D.N.J. 1999)
(describing the plaintiffs' claims as, inter alia, claims of unjust enrichment seeking
"restitution of ... the value of slave and/or enforced labor").
23 See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 347 n.27 (listing the German companies' procedural
objections).
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might be described as the 'statute of limitations' defense. They argued that,
assuming the suits were not barred because they implicated political questions,
and assuming that the plaintiffs could establish jurisdiction under the relevant
statutes, the suits were time-barred because the plaintiffs had waited too long
to bring their claims. 24 Unlike the Swiss bank cases, in which the judge
delayed answering the defendants' motions to dismiss, in the German slave
labor cases, a few judges actually ruled on the defendants' dispositive motions.
Judge Debevoise, of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey, dismissed the plaintiffs' suit in Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa AG
because, for the most part, he accepted the political question defense. 25 In
another case, Judge Greeneway, from the same district, dismissed the
plaintiffs' suit in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co. because, for the most part, he
accepted the statute of limitations defense. 26 All told, five lawsuits were
dismissed by November 1999. 27
Despite experiencing some success in court, on December 19, 1999, the
defendants struck a deal with the lead plaintiffs in all the slave labor suits. 28
The plaintiffs designed the settlement to end all current litigation and ensure
that no new litigation would occur.29 They agreed that, if the plaintiffs
voluntarily abandoned their lawsuits and did not object to the dismissal of all
similar suits, the German Parliament would charter, with the full cooperation
of various German industry associations, a private, ten billion Deutschmark
"German Fund Foundation," and that thjs foundation would pay reparations to
individuals and organizations who qualified under the principles established in
the agreement. 30
Despite prevailing in court, the German defendant
corporations were willing to pay approximately $5.2 billion for "legal
peace."31 Why they chose to do so is a matter of some speculation. Some
have opined that the Swiss experience made political and social pressure more
effective.32 Before the first suits were dismissed, New York City was
24
25

Id.

65 F. Supp. 2d 248,285 (D.N.J. 1999).
67 F. Supp. 2d 424,491 (D.N.J. 1999). The lawyers for the plaintiff were confident
that these district court decisions would be overturned on appeal. For a vigorous statement
of their views, see Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. I, 19 (2000).
27
See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 74.
28 See id. at 79.
29
See id. at 80-81.
30 Roger Cohen, Payback for Nazis' Slave Labour Approved: Claimants Expected to Get
About $2,500, GLOBE & MAIL, March 24, 2000, at Al I (reporting the details of the
settlement agreement).
31
See STUART E. EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR, AND
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR II 257 (2003) (quoting Roger Witten, the
German firms' lead lawyer in settlement negotiations); see also BAZYLER, supra note 18, at
83-88.
32 See BAZYLER, supra note 18, at 74-77.
26
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considering sanctions similar to those that had been threatened against the
Swiss banks. 33 After the suits were dismissed, legislation was introduced in
Congress threatening to overturn the decisions.34
Tobacco Litigation

B.

The state tobacco litigation came after forty years of mostly ineffective
attempts to hold the tobacco companies responsible for manufacturing a
defective product. 35 While some earlier suits alleged that cigarettes were
defective for no other reason than that they were associated with disease, most
suits focused on the failure of the tobacco industry to warn the public about the
risks of tobacco use, ranging from the health effects of smoking to the
addictive properties of nicotine. 36 Despite a handful of promising victories including short-lived certification of a national products liability class action personal injury claims arising from the manufacturing and marketing of
tobacco products were not succeeding. 37 Not only had they failed to generate
enough liability judgments to force significant changes in the industry's
conduct, but the litigation had not produced a dramatic or powerful
breakthrough in the industry's traditional defenses, which included their
steadfast insistence that they had not concealed or suppressed scientific

33

Political pressure was undoubtedly placed on the Swiss banks to settle the suits.
Senator Alfonse D' Amato, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
held hearings on the dormant Swiss bank accounts. New York and California's
comptrollers also threatened to withhold business from the Swiss banks and their American
subsidiaries unless the banks resolved the claims against them. See David E. Sanger,
McCall and State Dept. Clash on Sanctions Against Swiss Over Gold, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
1998, at BI (reporting on threatened sanctions against the Swiss banks).
34
See BAZYLER, supra note 26, at 78.
35
See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave Of Tobacco Litigation, in REGULATING
TOBACCO 176, 178 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001 ).
36
Id. at 184-85 (stating that "[t]hrough two waves of tobacco litigation, plaintiffs based
their claims on the industry's failure to warn of the health risks of smoking .. . . [N]icotine
addition, as a focal point ... had been tentatively explored [by a few plaintiffs' lawyers] in
the waning days of the second wave, but that had never been developed into the centerpiece
of the litigation" (emphasis in original)).
37
"From 1954 to 1994, a period of some forty years, approximately 813 claims were
filed by private citizens in tort actions in state courts against tobacco companies. Only twice
did courts find in favor of the plaintiffs, and both of these decisions were substantively
reversed on appeal." Arthur B. Lafrance, Tobacco Litigation: Smoke, Mirrors and Public
Policy, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 187, 190 (2000) (citing Elsa F. Kramer, Waiting To Exhale:
Tobacco Lawyers are Getting Burned by Damaging Industry Revelations. Can They Rise
From the Ashes?, REs GESTAE, May 1996, at 20; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F.
Supp. 208 (D.N.J. 1988), ajf'd in part and rev 'din part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), ajf'd
in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), rev 'd, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), amended by 370
F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966)).
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research establishing the risks of smoking.38
In 1994, Mississippi began a Medicaid restitution action against the tobacco
companies.39 The suit, which was filed in chancery, sought restitution
claiming the tobacco companies were unjustly enriched because the
Mississippi's Medicaid payments saved the tobacco companies the money they
ought to have paid to smokers. 40 Within a year, scores of other states filed
similar lawsuits alleging much the same claim of unjust enrichment. 41 The
Mississippi lawsuit settled in July of 1997 for $3 .6 billion to be paid by the
tobacco companies over twenty-five years.42 Florida settled its suit against the
industry in August 1997 for $11.3 billion,43 Texas settled its suit in January
1998 for $15.3 billion44 and Minnesota finally settled its suit for $6.1 billion on
the eve before the jury was to render its verdict. Following this trend, the
Attorneys General from the remaining states negotiated a $206 billion global
industry settlement in reimbursement for Medicaid and related health care
costs. 45
The state reimbursement claims shifted the legal terrain, which had allowed
the industry almost a half-century of legal immunity for its actions. While the
state claims were not exclusively based on an effort to get the industry to repay
38 See Rabin, supra note 35, at 184-85 (recounting the tobacco industry's efforts to
conceal the health effects of smoking, and describing the process by which these efforts
were exposed in the 1990s).
39 See Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in
State Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 566 (200 I).
40 See Rabin, supra note 35, at 189-93 ( discussing lawsuits filed by states seeking
reimbursement of health care costs).
41 Not all states chose to follow Mississippi's legal theory, however.
Minnesota' s
Attorney General filed a suit in 1994 alleging that the tobacco companies violated
Minnesota's consumer protection statutes designed to shield consumers from industry fraud
and deception. See Gary L. Wilson & Jason A. Gillmer, Minnesota 's Tobacco Case:
Recovering Damages Without Individual Proof of Reliance under Minnesota 's Consumer
Protection Statutes, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 567, 568 (1999). These acts were "the
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act, the Unlawful Trade Practices Act, the False Statement
in Advertising statute, and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act." Id. at 569.
Minnesota argued that the consumer fraud statute gave standing to the state to recover
Medicaid expenses that accrued because of consumer fraud. Id. at 574.
42 Milo Geyelin, Mississippi Becomes First State to Settle Against Big Tobacco
Companies, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1997, at B8.
43 Barry Meier, Cigarette Makers Agree to Settle Florida Lawsuit, N .Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
1997, at Al.
44
Milo Geyelin, Tobacco Firms to Pay Texas $15.3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1998,
atA3 .
45 In the Settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay roughly $206 billion by 2025
to forty-six states. This payout was in addition to the separate agreements with Mississippi,
Florida, Texas, and Minnesota (totaling $40 billion). See Milo Geyelin, Top Tobacco Firms
Agree to Pay States Up to $206 Billion in 25-Year Settlement, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1998,
at A3 .
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or reimburse the states, the unjust enrichment dimension of the litigation
strategy gave the states' litigation strategy its shape. The architects of the
Mississippi case, for example, shifted the focus from the harms smoking
caused to smokers to the harms smoking caused to the health care system. 46
They did this for two reasons. First, they believed that by focusing on the
losses suffered by the state, the question of smokers' own conduct would be
mooted, removing the single most powerful weapon in the tobacco industry's
defensive arsenal. 47 Second, and just as important, by making the state the
plaintiff, all issues of class certification raised in the context of earlier failed
attempts at personal injury class action litigation were mooted as well, because
instead of millions of plaintiffs, there would be only one. Concerns over
common issues of fact which doomed earlier class actions, and the
predominance and superiority tests of federal and state class action statutes
would no longer bar the lawsuits. A state could argue that although the
question of whether a state could recover against the tobacco defendants might
involve contested factual issues resolvable only through the testimony of
potentially numerous individual smokers, because those smokers were not
parties to the suit, their due process rights were not at issue and there was no
Castano-type numerosity or superiority barrier to the state's suits. 48
The move towards the single, unitary plaintiff came with some risks. Even
if, as lawyers for the states believed they could demonstrate, after exhaustive
discovery, the tobacco companies had lied to smokers and sold them a product
which was deliberately designed to cause injury and addiction, what standing
did the states have to bring a claim? There are a number of ways of
establishing standing. The most obvious would have been for the states to
have brought suit under the equivalent of "contractual" subrogation, a right
that they had under both state and federal law. 49 However, given the

46
47

See Rabin, supra note 35, at 189-93.

"[T]he states could not successfully frame their claims against the tobacco companies
in terms of either the traditional tort doctrine of subrogation or the codified version of the
doctrine that allows most state governments to seek reimbursement for medical
expenditures. Subrogation ... would put the states in the shoes of smokers - who, as we
know, had uniformly failed in their lawsuits against the tobacco companies up to that point."
Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563, 571 (2001). Or, as
Attorney General Michael Moore put it: "This time the industry cannot claim that a smoker
knew full well what risks he took each time he lit up. The state of Mississippi never smoked
a cigarette. Yet it has paid the medical expenses of thousands of indigent smokers who
did." Mike Moore, The States Are Just Trying to Take Care of Sick Citizens and Protect
Children, 83 A.B.A. J. 53, 53 (1997).
48 See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing class
certification on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed the predominance and superiority tests).
49
See, e.g., N.Y . Soc. SERV. LAW § 367-a(2)(b) (Gould 2004) (subrogating social
service officials for medical care costs); 18 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 542.1
(2004) (subrogating social service officials for smokers' medical expenditures); see also
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shortcomings of subrogation, the states turned to other legal theories. 50
Some states tried to frame their demand for reimbursement as a claim of
indemnity. 51 The classic case of indemnification occurs in tort, when one party
who has a duty to an injured victim pays that victim (either as a result of
judgment or settlement) and then sues another party who also owed a duty to
the victim for the entirety of the amount paid to the victim. 52 The duty to
indemnify cannot arise just because the payor "volunteers" to satisfy an
obligation owed by another. 53 Beyond this, the common law in most states
does not permit indemnification except under very limited circumstances. 54
Even if the claim for indemnification could be made sensible as a matter of
doctrine, it would still have put the states right back where they did not want to

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-120 (2003) (subrogating Maryland officials); 62 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 1409 (2004) (subrogating Pennsylvania officials).
50
Subrogation claims applied to tobacco litigation would be vulnerable to the same
defenses that the industry could have raised in the context of individual smoker's suits. The
most significant of these would have been a defense based on the statute of limitations,
which would have begun to run presumably at different times based on each smoker's
knowledge and a defense based on the fault of the smokers or their assumption of risk. See
William H. Pryor Jr. et al., Report of the Task Force on Tobacco Litigation Submitted to
Governor James and Attorney General Sessions, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 575 , 585-86 (I 997).
51
Those states that claimed a right to indemnity simply misunderstood the meaning of
that claim. As stated in section seventy-six of the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION,
indemnification may be demanded where "[a] person who, in whole or in part, has
discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another should
have been discharged by the other .. .. " RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI
CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS§ 76 (1935).
52 See w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 51 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
53
See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 708-09 (3rd ed. 2002). This is
made explicit in the draft RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 26 (Council Draft No. 3, 2001) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION] . It
clearly states that indemnification is a duty that arises between parties who breached a joint
duty that resulted in an injury to the victim, the compensation of which was provided by the
one party who now seeks indemnification from the other. See id. ("A claim to indemnity or
contribution arises when the claimant has discharged all or part of a common liability. A
claim under this Section must be distinguished, therefore, from the analogous claim that
arises when A and B owe independent duties to a third party, C, or when A, acting with
adequate justification, renders a performance to C for which B would have been liable to C
directly").
54
For example, in Iowa, if the parties are not joint tortfeasors, common law
indemnification is permitted only where there is an express contract, vicarious liability, or
the breach of an independent duty between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. See Daniels
v. Hi-Way Truck Equip., 505 N .W.2d 485, 490 (Iowa 1993). For this reason, Iowa' s
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the dismissal of the indemnity claim. State ex rel.
Miller v. Philip Morris, Inc., 577 N .W .2d 401 , 406 (Iowa 1998); see also Maryland v. Philip
Morris, Inc., No. 96122017, 1997 WL 540913, at *9-11 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21 , 1997).
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be - in the position of having to prove that the tobacco companies owed a duty
to compensate the smokers on whose behalf the states had expended funds for
medical care. 55 The tobacco industry thus could argue that indemnification for
the entire class of smokers who received medical care could not be presumed,
but would have to be proven on an individual, case-by-case basis, thus putting
the states back in the same place they would have been in had they pursued
multiple subrogation claims.
For this reason, many of the states opted to describe their reimbursement
claims as demands for restitution based on unjust enrichment. 56 In a number of
state in which unjust enrichment claims were challenged on motions to dismiss
by the tobacco companies, courts found that the alleged benefit conferred by
the states onto the tobacco companies was either too speculative to be
actionable or the result of mere volunteerism. 57 In a number of other states,
such as Mississippi, the tobacco companies' legal challenges never received
substantive review by any court (despite extensive briefing) before the cases
settled. 58 As Douglas Rendleman pointed out, the unjust enrichment claims by
the states were an attempt to establish that the funds the tobacco companies
never spent for tort compensation was a benefit unjustly conferred on them by
the states, which had, by offering medical care for free, somehow eliminated
that liability. 59 The weakest part of this argument was that its status assumed
the states had stepped in to partially pay (or mitigate) an obligation that the
tobacco companies would have been obliged to pay, which is exactly the issue
that the state had hoped to avoid when it abandoned the subrogation
argument. 60
55

The existence of an obligation between the indernnitee and the victim who received
money from the indernnitor is a prerequisite for the existence of a duty to indemnify
between the indernnitor and the indernnitee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION,
supra note 53, § 26.
56
In many states this claim was barred under the doctrine that unjust enrichment is not
available if any other remedy is available. This was the holding of courts in Iowa,
Maryland, Washington, and West Virginia.
57 See, e.g., Iowa v. R.J. Reynolds, Inc., No. CL 71048 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 1997),
http://stic.neu.edu/Ia/dec8-26.htm (last visited on November 6, 2004); Philip Morris, 1997
WL 540913 , at *9-11 ; Washington v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., No. 96-2-15056-8 SEA, 1996
WL 931316, at *9 (Wash. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996).
58
Professor Douglas Rendleman' s exhaustive review of the claims in equity made by the
lawyers working for the state takes a dim view of the cause of action from the perspective of
Mississippi law. Doug Rendleman, Common Law Restitution in the Mississippi Tobacco
Settlement: Did the Smoke Get in Their Eyes? 33 GA. L. REV. 847, 850-51 (1999).
59
Id. at 852-55 (explaining Mississippi's theory of why it was owed restitution by the
tobacco companies).
60
Professor Rendleman further explained that:
The plaintitrs first step in unjust enrichment is showing defendant's enrichment as a
benefit. The tobacco companies argue they were not enriched. A defendant must have
' economic benefit' as a prerequisite to restitution . . .. Only if the tobacco companies
were liable to the smokers for damages would the State's Medicaid payments to the
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Yet, like the Holocaust litigation, despite the absence of strong (or even
persuasive) legal support for the admittedly unusual use of restitution law in
the states' campaign against the tobacco industry, the defendants settled. 61
One can only speculate on the industry's motivations. As with the Swiss
banks, the litigation itself brought out information about the past practices of
the tobacco industry that had not been available to the public. Some of it, such
as the vast trove of documents that were pried out of the industry by aggressive
discovery conducted by the private attorneys representing the states, was a
direct result of the litigation. 62 Other documents, such as those produced by
whistle-blowers, received much more attention in the media than they probably
would have otherwise because of the litigation, which gave both context and
credence to their claims. 63 As with the Holocaust litigation, the information
generated by the lawyers caught the eye of politicians. 64 Finally, as with the
smokers be an 'economic benefit' to the tobacco companies. The tobacco companies
would have been enriched if the State had paid an obligation the tobacco companies
really owed. A restitution-indemnity plaintiff who discharges a duty to the defendant
owed may recover from the defendant . . . . The State cannot recover its payments for
the smokers' health care costs from the tobacco companies as restitution-indemnity
unless the tobacco companies were liable to the smokers.
Id. at 899 (internal citations omitted); see also Hanoch Dagan & James J. White,
Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 374-76 nn.9091 (2000) (disputing that any type of indemnity or unjust enrichment claim could have
been made by the states and acknowledging the difficulties for the states posed by the
affirmative defenses available to the tobacco companies in case subrogation claims were
brought); Tiffany S. Griggs, Comment, Medicaid Reimbursement From Tobacco
Manufacturers: ls The States' Legal Position Equitable?, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 799,800
( 1998) ("argu[ing] that that the states should not be able to obtain special advantages [in
the Medicaid reimbursement litigation] which are not available to individual claimants").
61 The Minnesota case settled after the judge instructed the jury but before they could
begin deliberating. According to one news report, the jurors felt angry at having been
usurped and were also surprised by the size of the settlement, suggesting that they would not
have awarded such a large sum. See David Phelps & Deborah Caulfield Ryback, Jury
Instructions Spurred Settlement Talks, STAR TRIB., Nov. 25, 1998, at ID.
62 See Michael V. Ciresi, et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the
Minnesota Tobacco Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 477, 479 (1999) (discussing the
tobacco companies' effort to conceal documents and how discovery in the Minnesota
lawsuit "resulted in the production of approximately thirty-five million pages of internal
industry documents").
63 In the early l 990's, Merrell Williams, a paralegal working for the firm representing
tobacco giant Brown & Williamson, procured documents containing evidence of the
industry's knowledge of the health risks and addictive nature of smoking. Jeffrey Wigand,
the head of research and development at Brown & Williamson, was fired in 1993 after years
of battling the company's refusal to acknowledge publicly the health risks of smoking and
nicotine's addictive qualities. Both Wigand's and Williams's revelations appeared in the
New York Times , the Wall Street Journal, and Congressional hearings on tobacco, and ended
up in the hands of anti-tobacco activists. Rabin, supra note 35, at 184.
64
The question of whether the CEOs of the seven major tobacco companies had lied to
Congress during hearings in 1994 was revived once the states uncovered evidence they
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Holocaust litigation, it is possible that at some point the managers of the
tobacco companies decided that the costs of the settlement would be worth
paying in exchange for putting the issue behind them. As many commentators
have noted, the master settlement agreement ("MSA") provided the industry
with a variety of benefits (including, perhaps, the creation of a barrier to new
entrants into their market) with a relatively modest cost, since the $240 billion
paid out would be collected from smokers over twenty-five years much like a
tax privately negotiated between the government and the firms who would
collect the tax on their behalf. 65
C.

American Slavery and Mass Restitution

In 2002, a number of lawsuits were filed in state and federal court that
demanded some form of compensation from corporations that benefited from
slavery. 66 The team of lawyers who brought the first suit in Brooklyn, New
York, spoke about the suit in terms of reparations for wrongdoing. Deadria
Farmer-Paellmann, one of the architects of the recent strategy of suing
corporations for unjust enrichment, said of the suits, "[t]he perpetrators of the
crimes committed against Africans are still here . . . . They profited from
stealing people and labor, torturing and raping women to breed children."67
The purpose of the suit was to secure "atonement" from those who had done
wrong to the plaintiffs. 68
It is hard to know how literally to take statements like this. It would seem
they reflect at least some of the lawyers' true motivations and the motivations
of those class members who support the suit. There is a potential disjunction
between the language of punishment and atonement and the structure of
restitution law. Typically, as noted above, restitution's main purpose is not to
believed proved the industry knew nicotine was addictive when the CEOs told Congress is
was not. See Mark Curriden, Texas to Subpoena Ex-Tobacco CEOs: They Denied Addictive
Nature ofNicotine in '94, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1997, at IA.
65 See DAGAN & WHITE, supra note 60, at 379-80. See generally W. KIP VISCUS!,
SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL (2002).
66 See, e.g., Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-4653 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17,
2003); Porter v. Lloyds of London, No. 02-CV-6180 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 29, 2002);
Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-9180 (E.D. La. filed Sept. 3, 2003); Barber v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N.J. filed May 2, 2002); Carrington v. FleetBoston
Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-1863 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002); Farmer-Paellmann v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-1862 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 26, 2002); Hurdle v.
FleetBoston Fin. Corp. , No. CGC-02-0412388 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 10, 2002).
Almost all of these suits have been consolidated through a federal MDL (Multidistrict
Litigation) order in the Northern District of Illinois. See In re African-Am. Slave
Descendants Litig. , 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1038 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The cases were dismissed
without prejudice on January 26, 2004. Id. at 1075.
67 Lewis Beale, Seeking Justice for Slavery 's Sins, L.A. TIMES, April 22, 2002, pt. 5, at I
(quoting Deadria Farmer-Paellmann).
68 Id.
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punish wrongdoers or to force wrongdoers to compensate victims for the
wrongful injuries they have caused. Those functions are better served by
public law (either criminal or regulatory) or tort law. 69 Restitution's function,
as Andrew Kull has put it, "is not to compensate the plaintiff, but to strip the
defendant of a wrongful gain ... [and] disgorgement, prima facie at least, does
not punish."70
Some of the rhetorical force behind all of the mass restitution suits discussed
in this section comes from the normative resonance of Ms. FarmerPaellmann' s language. The enslavement of Africans by Europeans, their
transport to the Americas, and the treatment that they and subsequent
generations suffered until emancipation was immoral and tortious. The human
rights of the men, women and children enslaved were violated, and they
suffered, in the language of tort, untold "wrongful losses" as a result of a wide
range of acts, ranging from battery to false imprisonment to the negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.71 Against the proper defendants,
the idea of some kind of legal action designed to punish and to secure
compensation seems not only sensible, but also compelling.
However, as with the Holocaust and tobacco litigation, the structure of the
slavery litigation is grounded much less on criminal or compensatory claims
than on restitutionary claims. The reasons for this in the context of the
Holocaust suits was that the negotiated end of the Second World War had
settled the question of political and criminal responsibility for all the acts of the
Nazis and their agents. 72 The treaties signed by the new German government
and the trials conducted by the Allies were the only punishment states were
going to visit upon the parties responsible for the atrocities that would later
form the foundation of the Holocaust restitution suits. 73
The main
compensation demanded in the Holocaust cases was for contract damages. 74
69 On this latter point, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective
Justice, in I THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 12 (2000).
70
Andrew Kull, Restitution 's Outlaws, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 17, 19 (2003).
71 For an extensive review of the "torts of slavery," see Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort
law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2004).
72
See A BriefHistory, supra note 7, at 21-22.
73
By 1998, Germany (the Federal Republic) had paid at least $60 billion in reparations
to the various parties entitled under the treaties described above. See BAZYLER, supra note
18, at 291. This figure is consistent with the numbers provided by Judge Debevoise in
Burger-Fischer v. De Gussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 270 (D.N.J. 1999). The Allies dealt
with corporate criminal liability after the war. The United States Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg prosecuted two bankers. Karl Rasche was acquitted of the charge that he had
provided loans for the construction of concentration camps, while Emil Puhl was convicted
of the charge that he had actively participated in the theft of gold from the victims of the
camp. See Anita Ramasastry, Banks And Human Rights: Should Swiss Banks Be Liable For
Lending
To
South
Africa's
Apartheid
Government?,
FINDLAW,
at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20020703.html (July 3, 2002).
74
"Plaintiffs' German law claims were garden-variety contract and unjust enrichment
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To the extent that tort-like damages were mentioned, it was in connection with
the suffering that resulted from the confinement of the slave laborers, not the
evils that formed the main core of the Holocaust - the campaign to exterminate
certain populations on the basis of their religion, ethnicity, or sexual
orientation. 75 In the tobacco litigation, for reasons that should be depressingly
familiar to American audiences, there has never been a serious effort by the
states or the federal government to penalize the tobacco industry for the
wrongdoing alleged in the states' restitution suits. 76 Because the states did not
want to encounter the same problems with affirmative defenses that had
defeated so many previous suits for personal injury, the restitution suits
carefully did not depend on proof that the tobacco industry caused wrongful
losses, only that it had acted wrongfully and thereby profited. 77
The Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint in the consolidated slavery lawsuit
reflects the same emphasis on restitution seen in earlier mass restitution
cases. 78 The plaintiffs sued only corporate defendants, not the United States,
nor any single state, nor any individuals. 79 They describe fourteen counts,

claims, seeking compensation for the reasonable value of their coerced services and
appropriate compensation for suffering caused by wretched conditions of confinement."
Burt Neuborne, Litigation in a Free Society: Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of
Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH . U. L.Q. 795,814 (2002).
75 There was, in addition to the contract and unjust enrichment claims, a demand for
damages based on the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"). This cause of action was premised
on the violation of the norm of customary international law prohibiting the enslavement of
conquered populations and on the Nuremberg principles barring the commission of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. My criticism of mass restitution litigation does not
have any connection with the attempt by the plaintiffs to use human rights laws to address
mass historical wrongs such as slave labor. The current African American slavery suit also
raises, as a separate basis for corporate liability, the ATCA. The problems with using the
ATCA in these sorts of cases are beyond the scope of this article. See BAZYLER, supra note
18, at 177 (explaining that the attempt to use the ATCA as the basis for jurisdiction for some
of the suits arising from Holocaust).
76
The one exception to this history of federal inaction is the lawsuit filed by the Justice
Department during the Clinton Administration in 1999, United States v. Philip Morris Inc.
The government sued for: restitution, under the Medical Care Recovery Act (MCRA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (2004), and the Medicare Secondary Payer (MSP) provisions, 42
U.S.C. § 1395y (2004); and disgorgement under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2004). The restitution claims were
dismissed in 2000 and the RICO claims set for trial in November 2004. See United States v.
Philip Morris Inc., C.V. No. 99-2496, 116 F. Supp. 2d 131 , 134 (D.D.C. 2000) (motion to
dismiss granted in part and denied in part).
77 Id. at 135 (explaining that basis for the government's lawsuits).
78
See First Consolidated and Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 8, In re AfricanAm. Slave Descendants Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 755 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (MDL No. 1491),
http://www.aetna.com/legal_issues/suits/06-26-03_complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 28,
2004) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
19 Id. 12(a).
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ranging from crimes against humanity to violations of the consumer protection
laws of five different states. 80 The dominant relief requested for each count
was the same: "an accounting of profits earned from slave labor, a constructive
trust imposed on such profits, restitution, equitable disgorgement, and punitive
damages." 81 With the exception of the demand for punitive damages, the
remedies demanded are typical of restitution (especially the demand for an
accounting of profits) and focus almost exclusively on the identification of and
return of the wealth the corporate defendants gained illegally and still hold. 82
The focus on corporate defendants, as in the Holocaust litigation, is
probably a result of certain contingent legal considerations. In Cato v. United
States, the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Government could not be
sued for slavery.83 The suit was rejected on the ground that it did not satisfy
the requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the law that sets out the
conditions under which the federal government has consented to be sued.84
More specifically, in addition to statute of limitations problems, the court
pointed out that the plaintiffs lacked standing, since their claim essentially was
that the U.S. Government had failed to take certain steps to positively enforce
the Thirteenth Amendment. 85 While the Cato decision has been discussed
frequently since it was issued, few commentators have argued that it is legally
infirm. 86 The states are also probably immune from suit for similar reasons.
Private individuals are obviously unattractive targets for suit for two
reasons. First, those directly responsible for the human rights violations and
the torts committed before emancipation are not available to be sued. 87

80

The fourteen causes of action alleged in the First Amended Complaint were
Conspiracy, Accounting, Crime Against Humanity, Piracy, Intentional Infliction of Emotion
Distress (for Rape, Breeding, Torture, Abuse, and the Spread of Racist Beliefs), Conversion,
Unjust Enrichment, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, Alien Torts Claims Act, Illinois State Claim,
Louisiana State Claim, New Jersey State Claim, New York State Claim, and Texas State
Claim. Id. at 93-115 .
81
In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1042 (N.D. Ill.
2004). The damages which would be awarded under the ATCA claim (which was pied in
the alternative) and the consumer fraud statutory claims were not specified.
82
First Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 8.
83 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (1995).
84
Id. ; see 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2004).
85 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1109-10.
86 See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, The Development of the Movement for Reparations for African
Descendants, 3 J.L. Soc' y 133, 140 (2002) (commenting neutrally on Cato); Alfred L.
Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 497, 512 (2003) (commenting neutrally on Cato); Chad W. Bryan, Precedent
for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress and Where Awarding
Reparations/or Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REv. 599,604 (2003) (commenting neutrally
on Cato); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery As A Takings Clause Violation , 53 AM. U. L.
REV. 191 , 248 (2003).
87
This point iG separate from whether descendents of legal wrongdoers should feel a
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Therefore, the only way to raise claims for personal injuries directly would be
to identify a defendant that still exists to be sued, which would naturally entail
identifying a corporate defendant, which could then be held responsible either
derivatively under the doctrine of respondeat superior or directly under the
theory that its agents engaged in wrongdoing under the direction of the firm's
management. 88 Second, to the extent that the descendents of individual
slaveholders, slave traders, and other officials who operated the machinery of
slavery hold property that belonged to slaves or hold wealth created by slaves,
they are likely to be immune from suit under the good faith purchaser
doctrine. 89 An heir is not a purchaser but someone who received money and
relied (presumably) in good faith that the transfer was valid by making
expenditures and, in the case of slavery, passing the property on to another
generation of heirs, who also acted in good faith. 90 As a theoretical matter, the
plaintiffs might have been able to make a claim for restitution of wealth
inherited by the heirs of wrongdoers from the nineteenth century. As a
practical matter, any suit would require tracing the movement of chattel and
money over many generations and an uphill battle to overcome the balance of
equities which would, as an initial matter, favor the defendants. 91
moral or political responsibility for the actions of their forbears. See Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
323 ( 1987); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
lnjusitces, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003); George Schedler, Responsibility for and
Estimation of the Damages of American Slavery, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 307 (2003); Jeremy
Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4 (1992); Kaimipono David Wenger,
Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
88 See Alfreda Robinson, Corporate Social Responsibility and African American
Reparations: Jubilee, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 309, 358-61 (2003).
89 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 53, at§ 26.
90 See Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law
Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 , 127 (2004) (explaining that the descendants of
slaves may be able to make an unjust enrichment claim against the heirs of the
slaveowners); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification,
Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1156-57 (2004)
[hereinafter Dagan, Restitution and Slavery] (arguing that targeting recipients of goods who
acted in bad faith is one way restitution law attempts to solve the problem of
intergenerational justice).
91
It should be noted that heirs of slave wealth might not be as obviously innocent as the
bona fide purchaser defense requires. It is an open question how much each subsequent
generation after emancipation knew about the origins of family property as it descended.
Furthermore, as Alfred Brophy noted, claims for restitution of chattel or real property may
strike courts as less susceptible to the bona fide purchaser defense than restitution of profit.
See Brophy, supra note 90, at 127 (discussing Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d.
954 (9th Cir. 2000), in which the niece (and heir) of the owner of a painting that had been
given to the Austrian Gallery under duress sued for its return). The Altmann case is not a
very convincing example, as the defendant cannot honestly be described as an innocent
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Other practical considerations made claims for restitution from corporate
defendants the most sensible course of action. Although the plaintiffs alleged
in their complaint actions by the defendants that sounded in personal injury,
their argument for why their claim was not time-barred by applicable statute of
limitations depends in crucial ways on the wrong arising from a failure on the
part of the defendants to disgorge their wrongful gains. 92 Judge Norgle noted
that, in answer to the inevitable question of why suits arising from events
ending in the nineteenth century were not barred by statute of limitations for
common law and statutory claims that ranged from one to six years, the
plaintiffs invoked the discovery rule, the continuing violation doctrine,
equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling.93
While Judge Norgle was
unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments, they reveal why, relatively speaking,
their claims for restitution against existing corporations would be more likely
to survive a statute of limitations attack than a suit for personal injury against
an individual or corporation or a suit for restitution against a corporation. The
plaintiffs used the complex and continuing existence of the corporate
defendants as an additional factor designed to move judicial discretion in their
favor. 94 In the complaint, the plaintiffs emphasized that the original plaintiffs,
the slaves themselves, could not know about the "investments, insurance
policies, joint ventures[,] and other schemes developed by [the] defendants ...
to profit from slavery."95 This is in contrast, presumably, to the kidnapping,
beatings, murder, and rape the slaves knew about and over which they could

purchaser. See Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Note, Ghosts of the Holocaust: Holocaust Victim
Fine Arts Litigation and a Statutory Application of the Discovery Rule, 50 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 87, 96-98 (1999) (describing recent claims regarding art stolen during World War II).
But see Elizabeth Tyler Bates, Contemplating Lawsuits for the Recovery of Slave Property:
The Case of Slave Art, 55 ALA. L. REV. I l09, I 121 (2004) (describing the "underlying
principle of property law that a thief cannot pass good title in the stolen property, even to an
innocent good-faith purchaser"). The discussion of the status of innocent purchasers of
stolen property underscores the importance of keeping straight the various categories of
restitution at issue. Of crucial importance to the bona fide purchaser defense of the heirs of
wealth created by slavery is that the slaves had no title to the property that the slaveholders
wrongfully obtained by means of the slave labor. I discuss this point in Anthony J. Sebok,
Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between
the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 651,655 (2003) (explaining that plaintiffs who can
only claim title through equity are on the same footing as the heirs of the bona fide
purchasers).
92
First Amended Complaint, supra note 78, at 85-91 .
93 In re African-Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1070, l074 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (explaining that plaintiffs invoked the discovery rule). I am not including in this
discussion the plaintiffs arguments concerning the statute of limitations for crimes against
humanity, which they maintain have no statute of limitations.
94
Id. at l039-41 (outlining plaintiffs allegations against corporate defendants).
95 Id. at 1070 (quoting plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss).
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have sued after emancipation (albeit without any credible hope of success). 96
Furthermore, while not argued explicitly, there is an expectation that
corporations are more capable of maintaining and handling information than
individuals. A court that might have taken the view that the absence of
information that could have led to a restitution claim within the applicable
statute of limitations was no one's fault in the case of a claim between the
descendents of a slave and a slaveholder, they might take a less charitable view
in a case involving a corporate defendant. Firms and other corporate entities,
such as universities, could be seen as willfully blind if they made no inquiry
into the source of their assets, thus strengthening the claim that the failure to
engage in an accounting of assets is a continuing violation or worse, grounds
for the plaintiff to claim equitable estoppel.
For reasons relating to the selection of defendant and the desire to avoid
various affirmative defenses, the slavery suit that was filed was basically a
restitution suit. As the media noted, the suit clearly arose from one of the most
widespread and injurious assault on human rights in history. Yet, as with the
Holocaust and tobacco suits, the logic of mass restitution forced the plaintiffs
to depict slavery not as a personal or dignitary injury, but as a dispute over
wrongfully held property. Farmer-Paellmann has conceded that tactical and
legal concerns led the lawyers to focus their claims on only a subset of
wrongdoers (corporations) and a subset of private law remedies (unjust
enrichment): "We focused on the path ofleast resistance, the corporations ....
The theory, basically, is that the corporations are in possession of our
inheritance. " 97
II.

THE RISKS OF MASS RESTITUTION

Is there any reason to regret the strategic choice to reframe a claim about the
crime of slavery as a claim about the wrongful gains of corporations? There
are two ways to think about this question. The first is to accept the premise of

96

The plaintiffs argued that the limitations period should be equitably tolled not only
because of lack of information, but because of the lack of equal access to the justice system.
Id. at 1074. Judge Norgle did not accept this argument:
It is true that because of the institution of slavery, the Jim Crow laws, and the lingering
bigotries and separatist views following the Civil War, African-Americans were
obstructed from obtaining necessary information on their claims and in some instances
access to the legal system. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' ancestors knew of their injury at
the time that it occurred. They knew, or should have known that they were wrongfully
being forced to work without compensation, and that somebody was making a profit
from their labor. Yet, neither Plaintiffs nor their ancestors ever asserted these claims in
a court of law until now. Plaintiffs have not shown that they acted with all due
diligence in attempting to obtain vital information about their claims, and assert them
timely.
Id. at 1074.
97
Zanto Peabody, Forum Addresses Slave Reparations: Speakers Urge Black
Descendants to Join Fight for Financial Redress, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 17, 2002, at A42.
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the question (that the pursuit of restitution is a second-best solution to alternate
legal claims) but to weigh the costs and benefits of using a legal fiction such as
restitution. The second is to reject the premise and argue that there is nothing
second-best about the restitution claims - that the disgorgement of wrongfully
gained corporate profits should be one of(although not the only) core purposes
of a legal response to massive historical wrongdoing. I shall look at each
argument in tum.
A.

Commodification

The basic argument against using restitution as a tactic is that it obscures the
real wrong that originally motivated the change in social attitudes that made
the litigation possible. This might seem like a highly formalistic concern.
After all, the lawyers and activists who bring mass restitution suits are
probably more aware than most that too little attention had been paid to the
underlying wrongs relating to the relationship between German and Swiss
corporate elites and the Nazi government, or the enduring power of the tobacco
industry over both American government and media, or the failure of
American society to take steps to rectify the consequences of centuries of
slavery. Yet the temptation to do something might obscure the cost of doing
anything instead of doing nothing.98 Is there a cost?
It is hard to approach the question empirically. Before the Holocaust suits
were brought, the public had paid little attention to the conduct of Swiss banks
or the role of slave labor in German industry during World War II.
Undoubtedly, more attention is being paid now, and one should think that this
is a good thing. The same can be said for the state reimbursement suits against
the tobacco industry. Before the states began their litigation, public attitudes
about the industry, while increasingly hostile, had not yet completely turned.
As I have argued elsewhere, the most important consequence of the state's
litigation has been on the political environment, which has turned decidedly
negative towards the tobacco industry. 99 One might argue that individual
smokers' cases have also been affected, and that the relatively higher rate of
plaintiff victories (as well as spectacular punitive damages) is a direct result of
the litigation. 100
98

"The risk of litigation is not simply acting in default, it is defaulting too much in
action." Lafrance, supra note 37, at 202 (discussing the failure of the tobacco litigation).
99 See A Brief History, supra note 7; Anthony J. Sebok, Pretext, Transparency and
Motive in Mass Restitution Litigation, 57 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
100
Since the Master Settlement Agreement, the tobacco industry's record has still been
impressive, but it is now losing a greater proportion of cases than in the period described in
the text accompanying note 37, supra. See Peter D. Jacobson & Soheil Soliman, Litigation
as Public Health Policy: Theory or Reality?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 224, 230-31 (2002) (of
post-MSA trials examined, the tobacco industry won 12 cases and lost six). See, e.g.,
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 205 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1254 (D. Kan. 2002) (jury
returned a verdict granting Burton a $196,416 compensatory award and authorizing punitive
damages; the court later added a $15 million punitive award); Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
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Against the general and untestable assertion that mass restitution litigation
has changed social attitudes and enabled further and salutary legal and political
progress, there is some evidence that the restitution strategy in the Holocaust
litigation and tobacco reimbursement suits failed to provide a clear normative
judgment about the wrongfulness of the defendants' underlying conduct. One
ironic result of the MSA, for example, is that the same states that sued the
tobacco industry on the grounds that it had profited from the promotion of a
product that caused sickness and death are now dependent on the sale of that
product to maintain their state budgets. 101 Observers critical of the MSA have
argued that it has blunted or halted momentum towards a larger discussion of
national or state-wide smoking policy. 102 Arthur Lafrance argued that this was
because the consequences of litigation, if truly carried out, would have been
too calamitous for American society to accept, so the states allowed a process
to go forward that neither forced the industry to address its tortious conduct nor
achieved the sort of public health policy that legislative debate and
compromise might have produced. 103
122 Cal. App. 4th 684, 692-93 (2004) (jury awarded $5,539,127 in compensatory and $3
billion in punitive damages; punitive damages reduced to $50 million on appeal); Henley v.
Philip Morris Inc., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1429, 1437, 1475 (2004) (jury awarded $1.5 million in
compensatory and $50 million in punitive damages; punitive damages reduced to $9 million
on appeal); Frankson v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 781 N.Y.S.2d 427,427 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (jury originally awarded $350,000 in compensatory and $20 million in
punitive damages); Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 92 P.3d 126, 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2004)
(jury awarded $821,485.80 in compensatory, later reduced by the court to $521,485.80, and
$79.5 million in punitive damages). Because of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (establishing a
framework for determining whether punitive damage awards are excessive and therefore
violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), virtually all of the punitive
damages awards in these cases either have or will be appealed, and have or probably will be
reduced.
101
For example, in two recent cases where it appeared that the industry might face
bankrupting court proceedings brought by private litigants, the states came to the aid of the
tobacco industry, and helped the industry blunt legal maneuvers by private plaintiffs to
fatally wound the industry. See John Kennedy, Tobacco Verdicts Light Up Fears:
Lawmakers Are Afraid Settlement Money Might Disappear, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., April
11, 2000, at Dl (Florida legislature plans to cap appeals bonds retroactively to protect
tobacco industry in Engle suit); States Try to Save Cigarette Maker and Their Own Coffers:
Philip Morris Threatens Bankruptcy: One Suit too Many?, DETROIT NEWS, April 12, 2003,
at D6 (a majority of the nation's state attorneys general filed a brief in an Illinois consumer
class action seeking to protect Philip Morris from paying the full amount of a $12 billion
appeal bond). Most states seem to have diverted much of their MSA payments towards
general funds. See, e.g., Kevin Corcoran, Efforts to Reduce Smoking Take a Hit: Budget
Diverts Tobacco Funds to Other Programs, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 13, 2003, at lB.
102
Lafrance, supra note 37, at 189 (arguing that the MSA has not adequately addressed
the wrongs committed by the tobacco industry).
103
"What is different about tobacco litigation, however, is that the potential claimants are
so numerous, the scope of the offending conduct so vast and the resources of the defendants
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Libby Adler and Peer Zumbansen have argued that the Swiss bank and
German slave labor litigation was not a success because it failed to produce a
clear normative judgment about the conduct of the defendants. 104 The
corporations were permitted to represent to the world that they had accepted
"moral" but not legal responsibility for their actions by settling the cases. 105
According to Adler and Zumbansen, this was a sham: the settlement had no
actual moral force because all the participants in its negotiation, such as the
United State's representative, Stuart Eizenstat, treated the legal claims as if
they were mere pretense. 106 By successfully persuading the public that the
legal claims had little merit, the defendants also avoided a serious debate over
their moral responsibility.107 Adler and Zumbansen observed that the
settlement left many of the plaintiffs in the class action feeling unsatisfied,
since no credible correspondence existed between the remedy the lawsuits
demanded and the settlement actually secured. 108
Adler and Zumbansen argued that the slave labor claims, when asserted,
were open to two interpretations: as restitution for unpaid labor or as

so huge, that conventional litigation is simply inadequate to capture and contain the issues
or assure appropriate relief. It thus fails both as a policy and a compensatory vehicle." Id.
104
Libby Adler & Peer Zumbansen, The Forgetfulness of Noblesse: A Critique of the
German Foundation Law Compensating Slave and Forced Laborers of the Third Reich, 39
HARV. J. ON L EGIS. 1, 3 (2002).
105
Id. at 54 (concluding that the companies' statements that they owed a moral, though
not legal duty, are untenable).
106
Id. at 28-30.
107
Adler and Zumbausen describe this tactic:
The strategy of separating moral or political responsibility from legal responsibility
has served the companies well. Today's enlightened German industrialists have earned
endless congratulations for courageously coming to terms with injuries largely ignored
for 55 years while at the same time leaving themselves room to deny the validity of the
legal claims. A close examination of the legal issues reveals, however, that the
separation is a false one, and that some of the most difficult moral questions associated
with the Holocaust - questions about agency and about why it happened - underlie the
particular legal issues raised . . . .
Ultimately, therefore, the refrain offered by the companies that they owe a moral
responsibility but not a legal one is untenable. Each of the defenses that the companies
proffered implies not just a disclaimer of legal liability, but also a larger denial of
remorse.
Id. at 53-54 (internal citations omitted).
108
This dissatisfaction is illustrated by two plaintiff's experiences:
On June 28, the day she received at most $2,200, Alicja Chy! of Poland told the
Associated Press, "It's a piteous amount of money . . . . It' s nothing for my work."
Aron Krell, a Polish-born survivor living in New York, lamented, "To me this is partial
back pay - very little, very late ... Even if you said we were owed the minimum wage
that was prevalent then in Germany, with a tiny rate of interest the amounts would have
to be much, much larger than what we' re getting."
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
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reparations for an injury rooted in racist ideology. 109 The defendants seized
upon the settlement to suppress the latter interpretation and promoted the
former because it carried with it little or no moral consequences. 110 I agree
with this characterization of what happened, and its aftermath. What Adler
and Zumbansen did not consider, however, is the degree to which the
plaintiffs' own tactical choices produced the opportunity seized by the
defendants. Adler and Zumbansen argued that a reparative interpretation could
have been imposed on the mass restitution suits that had been filed. 111 Their
view is consistent with Hanoch Dagan's paper in this volume. 112 As a
historical matter, they agree that something was lost in the course of the
Holocaust litigation. Whether reparative meaning can be preserved in suits for
restitution is something that will have to be set aside until the next section.
Why might reframing tort-like claims relating to personal and dignitary
injuries into a claim about unpaid labor fail to capture the wrongful conduct
that originally motivated mass restitution claims? By grounding their claims in
unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs are emphasizing the defendants' wrongful
retention of some thing (wealth) that legally belongs to the plaintiffs and not
the defendants. This is merely an elaboration of the fact that wealth held by
the corporations is the present-day value of the labor that was wrongfully
obtained by those same defendants during slavery. It is true that one way of
describing slavery is that it is forced labor without pay. But that's an
impoverished understanding of slavery, which involves a complex series of
harms, and which is not necessarily primarily about the failure to compensate
another for labor. 113 To focus on the value of the labor "commodities" the
wrongs of slavery by equating one type of remedy (disgorgement) with the
wrong (unjust enrichment).

109

Id. at 53.
[T]he Nazi labor program can be viewed as either war-related or as a matter of racial
ideology .... War as well as racist ideological motives propelled the program and gave
rise to plaintiffs' injuries, so neither the legal conclusion that plaintiffs were seeking
reparations nor the contrary conclusion that they were seeking compensation for a
private wrong was required.
Id. at 48 .
110
Id. at 53.
111 Id. at 49.
112 See Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1140-41 (establishing a
framework for evaluating mass restitution suits).
113 There are multiple definitions of slavery designed for multiple purposes (the
enforcement of international law, the Thirteenth Amendment, or historical research). The
purpose of this article is to analyze the conceptual structure of private law and its function in
American society. For this purpose, the following definition seems to capture a broad sense
of the term slavery: "A power relation of domination, degradation, and subservience, in
which human beings are treated as chattel, not persons." Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1365 (1992).

2004]

REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: ANTHONY J SEBOK

1427

The minimum requirements for a claim of unjust enrichment based on
quantum meruit are:
(1) [A] benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the
acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such
circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment of its value. 114
The slavery class action requires its plaintiffs to argue that the legal claim
that have been preserved and carried forward for generations of African
Americans is not that their ancestors were kidnapped from their homes, their
political freedoms denied, and their culture obliterated, but that they were not
paid for the work they did under those conditions. The problem with this claim
is not that it is legally invalid - the factual conditions for a quantum mentit
claim are satisfied by slavery. 115 The problem is that a claim for restitution as
a result of work done during enslavement seems to treat the other wrongful
aspects of slavery as nothing more that events of wealth-production. By
making restitution the only remedy (assuming the tort and human rights actions
are dismissed), the litigants have limited their complaint about the grotesque
wrongs of slavery to complaints that the grotesque wrongs produced wealth to
which they were entitled. This is what I mean by commodification.

B. Legal Fictions
One response to this concern is to note that the law makes productive use of
"legal fictions" all the time. 116 Lon Fuller defended legal fictions on the
ground that they are sometimes necessary to allow an unfamiliar or emerging
legal concept to take root in a legal system. 117 A legal fiction could provide a

114

Haz-Mat Response v. Certified Waste Servs., 910 P.2d 839, 847 (Kan. 1996). To
define the grounds for restitution based on a claim for quantum meruit in terms of unpaid
labor is not to say that it is not a form of rights vindication, however. That is, if the
withholding of the wealth produced by the plaintiffs labor is wrong, then the plaintiff has a
prima facie right to the wealth. On this point I agree with Dagan. See Dagan, Restitution
and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148-49 (quoting Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages
as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 4-5, 11 (1999)).
115
Similarly, there is no doubt that the claims for the money, property, and wealth gained
from slavery were properly the subject of restitution claims based on claims for replevin,
money had and received and quantum meruit in the Swiss Bank cases and the Holocaust
slave labor cases. As Irwin Cotler put it, "we are talking about thefticide - the greatest mass
theft on the occasion of the greatest mass murder in history." Irwin Cotler, The Holocaust,
Thefticide and Restitution: A Legal Perspective, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 602 (1998). The
question this article raises is not whether theft occurred, but whether "thefticide" is a
category that should stand in the same normative and political space as genocide. See Id.
11 6
See Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 , 1118 n.281
(1999).
117
LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 70 (1967).
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rationale or justification for a line of cases that fits the precedents, but which
would not necessarily persist as a principle. 118 Fuller quoted from John
Chipman Gray, who said that "[s]uch fictions are scaffolding - useful, almost
necessary, in construction - but, after a building is erected, serving only to
obscure it." 119 Applying this viewpoint to the mass restitution cases, it
suggests that my formalist concerns can be set aside as long as the fictions
employed are designed (or have the potential) to allow a new and less
provisional set of legal concepts to take hold.
Fuller took the position that fictions which identified themselves as such
were usually harmless and often helpful - doctrines that claimed for
themselves "nonfictitious" status "often ha[ve] a spurious self-evidence about
[them]." 120 However it is not clear whether the decision to sue for restitution is
a legal fiction as opposed to an exercise of discretion to choose one legal
avenue instead of another (albeit for understandable tactical reasons). As
mentioned above, unjust enrichment claims compose part of the prima facie
claims that a proper plaintiff could demand from defendants who played a role
American slavery. They are not fictional, just as the genuine prima facie
restitution suits arising from Holocaust and the tobacco litigation are not
fictional. The issue of legal fiction in these cases is not so much about the
adoption of a rationale for the doctrine the plaintiffs' hope to use - quantum
meruit - but about the rationale for choosing that species of private law claim
as opposed to one sounding in tort or constitutional law.
In any event, according to Fuller, a legal fiction "that is plainly fictitious
must seek its justification in considerations of social and economic policy." 121
What negative consequences might flow from the "commodification" of the
plaintiffs' claims in the slavery suits, even if the claims are properly called
legal fictions?
In her book Contested Commodities, the legal scholar Margaret Radin noted
that there is a real risk in adopting the rhetoric of property when discussing
serious issues involving bodily integrity. 122 Her argument was based on the
problem of how to properly describe the wrong of rape. 123 Radin was
disturbed by the growing popularity among private law scholars of defining

118
For example, the original justification for the "attractive nuisance" doctrine may no
longer be plausible, but it served to help establish the exception to landowner liability rules
that were otherwise too pro-defendant. Id. at 71.
119
Id. at 70 (quoting JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 35 (2d ed.
1921)).
120 Id. at 71.
121 Id.
122 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 87 (1996) [hereinafter
CONTESTED COMMODITIES] (noting problems with using the rhetoric of property when
discussing matters of bodily integrity).
123 Id. at 86 (questioning Posner's use of market theory to discuss rape).
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rape as a decision to "bypass" the market. 124 Radin' s concern went beyond
worrying that such arguments might be mishandled, resulting in an
undervaluing of the "costs" of rape. 125 Her larger concern related to the
rhetoric itself. The phrase "market bypass" implied that there is a proper
market for the attribute sought by the wrongdoer (in this case, a rapist). 126
Radin argued that to most people, this presumption "seems intuitively out of
place ... so inappropriate that it is either silly, or somehow insulting to the
value being discussed, or both." 127
Radin explained her intuition by drawing a distinction between bodily
integrity, which is an "attribute" of personhood, and the things over which a
person has control, which can properly be called objects or things (even if they
are intangible, such as the product of human imagination). Radin's objection
to some scholars' use of market language in the context of rape is instructive.
Her complaint went beyond the mere instrumental. A market language
approach to rape might be quite well-intentioned, but no matter how hard its
advocates hope it would produce a world in which women were better off, it
would fail for a fundamental reason. 128 There is, Radin argued, a cost to
detaching an attribute of personhood from a person:
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is
threatening to personhood because it detaches from the person that which
is integral to the person. Such a conception makes actual loss of the
attribute easier to countenance .. . . [I]f my bodily integrity is an integral
personal attribute, not a detachable object, then hypothetically valuing my
bodily integrity in terms of money is not far removed from valuing me in
terms of money. 129
Radin suggested that while many scholars believe they are wielding
conceptual tools, exactly as they want to when they "borrow" the language of
the market - often to appear hard-nosed - they risk becoming unwilling allies
to the idea that everything can be reduced to forms of money and property. 130

124

Id. at 86-87 (citing RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (4th ed.
1992) (concluding that rapists bypass the normal sexual relations market); Guido Calabresi
& A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1124-27 (1972) (arguing that people should hold an
entitlement, akin to property laws, for their personal bodily integrity)).
125 Id. at 87 (explaining that some users of a cost-benefit analysis may not place
sufficient value on the costs of rape).
126 Keith Hylton adopts the phrase "market bypassing" from Posner in his discussion of
the tort of slavery. See Hylton, supra note 71 , at 1244.
127 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 87.
12s Id.
129

Id. at 88.
Id. at 92 (reflecting on whether to view rape, in a cost-benefit scheme, as an act that
benefits the rapist); see Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch : The Lethal Effect of Wealth
Maximization, 1999 WIS. L. REv. 687, 717 (1999) ("The most prominent proponent of what
130
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She called this a "domino theory," in which, despite the best intentions of all
involved, market language crowds out non-market language. 131 The ultimate
cost of using market language is not necessarily that the specific goal which
led to the tactical adoption of the commodified language is stymied, but rather
that there are less obvious spill-over "social" effects, such as the infiltration of
market language into contexts where non-market values and reasons should
dominate. 132
Radin was skeptical of the domino theory, but not necessarily as a
descriptive matter. 133 Yet she felt that there were good reasons why people
should resist the spread of market rhetoric, and noted that, unless carefully
handled, language that commodities attributes of personality can often lead
lawyers and legal language astray. 134 She preferred a conception of property
that allowed for "incomplete commodification." An interaction can reflect
incomplete commodification to the extent that it allows market and non-market
interpretations simultaneously. 135 The example she used to illustrate this
concept was work. Radin noted that aspects of work could be commodified
while others could not. 136 The details of which aspects of work as a contested
concept fall on which side of the divide is less important for my discussion of
slavery than noting that, for Radin, the key to avoiding the caricatured legal
rhetoric of commodification depended on keeping straight which legal
categories could be appropriately treated by market language (and concepts)
and which could not. 137

is here called 'romanticism' - the fear that market transactions will result in an alienating
universal commodification of subjects as well as objects - is Margaret Jane Radin.").
131 CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 99-100 (explaining that there is a
slippery slope, wherein market regime language beings to include everything that has
value).
132
"Margaret Radin has presented a powerful argument that [market] rhetoric can and
does, over time, influence the way we conceptualize the world, and ultimately act in the
world." Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203,235 n.211 (2003).
133
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 103 (arguing that the domino theory is
not absolute, in that when both market and nonmarket understandings exist, the market
theory will not necessarily win out); see Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar:
On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 75, 91 n.62 (2004) (agreeing with Radin
that the domino theory is not absolute in its prediction that some commodification will lead
to absolute commodification).
134
"This kind of resistance to the domino theory would see a nonmarket aspect to much
of the market." CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 101.
135
Id. at 102-03 (explaining that market and nonmarket understandings can exist and
overlap if the individual understandings of each are not crystallized).
136
Id. at 105 (explaining that the concept of work contains both commodified and
noncommodified elements).
137
"Complete commodification of work - pure labor - does violence to our notion of
what it is to be a well-developed person." Id. at 107.
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A claim for unjust enrichment from slavery measures the wrongful taking
from the slave entirely by the slave's labor-value, and so suggests a rhetoric of
complete commodification. The risk, therefore, in responding to slavery
through the lens of unjust enrichment is that it fails to offer a legal
characterization of the wrong that occurs when the non-commodifiable aspect
of labor is violated. 13 8
III. THE HARM OF "Loss OF CONTROL" AND COMMODIFICATION
Another argument that can be made in response to the commodification
problem is that claims for restitution of labor are not legal fictions at all - they
do exactly what they ought to do, which is to allow people to "vindicate" their
rights to autonomy through money damages. Hanoch Dagan makes this
argument forcefully in his forthcoming book, The Law and Ethics of
Restitution, and also in an article in this symposium. 139
Dagan's argument is complex, and I will simplify it here. He argues that the
right to a resource is a complex and contested concept. 140 In this sense, he
agrees with Radin, who also described property as a contested concept. 141 For
Dagan, the question of restitution is not so much about the right to property but
the entitlements one has in various resources. Those rights are determined by
the variety of values society wishes to recognize in an entitlement. 142 They
include the "cherished libertarian value of control, [the] utilitarian value of
well-being, [and the] value of sharing ... [which] calls for other-regarding
actions and seeks to inculcate other-regarding motives." 143 These values,
become the entitlements for which a property-holder can demand restitution if
they are infringed. 144
The two values that are of the most importance for claims of restitution
arising from slavery are the values of control and well-being. In his earlier
work, Dagan had analogized control to the entitlement protected by a

138

A tort action for battery or false imprisonment would not really do this either, which
is why Hylton suggests a new hybrid tort, which he calls the "social torts" of slavery. See
Hylton, supra note 71, at 1224-29. This article does not necessarily reject this proposal. It
only argues that unjust enrichment cannot capture the "incompletely commodified" nature
of free labor.
139 DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on
file with the author) [hereinafter DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION]; Dagan,
Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148.
140
DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 239).
141
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 104 (explaining that there are situations
of contested commodification that should be compared to how powerful the market
conceptualization is).
142
DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 230-31 ).
143 Id.
144

Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1148-49 (arguing that the wrongs
committed are not wrongs against property rights, but against basic human rights).
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Calabresi-Melamed property rule and well-being to the entitlement protected
by a Calabresi-Melamed liability rule. 145 The former protects the rightholder's power of consent over the resource, and the latter protects the rightholder's interest in an objective level of utility in the resource. 146 The different
entitlements are protected by different measures of recovery: consent by the
"profits measure" and well-being by the measure of the resource's "fair-market
value." According to Dagan, each measure of recovery is a form of
rectification and thus fits within the corrective justice model of private law:
"The profits measure reflects and reverses a breach of the plaintiffs
entitlement to control the resource, while the fair-market value reflects and
reverses a breach of her entitlement to the well-being embodied by the
resource." 147
According to Dagan, the commodification problem dissolves because not all
restitutionary remedies rectify a resource-holder's loss of economic value. A
restitutionary remedy for the loss of control has a social meaning different
from a restitutionary remedy for loss of well-being. 148 When a restituitonary
remedy of profits is awarded, it vindicates a resource-holder's autonomy.
Dagan takes from this that, in unjust enrichment, restitution for profits in
excess of the fair market value of the thing taken is conditioned on the loss of
plaintiffs control over her labor, not over the labor itself. 149 Thus, when the
plaintiffs in a mass restitution suit sue in restitution for the profits of slavery,
they are not only not engaged in a legal fiction, they are explicitly using the
law to recover the loss of an interest that is central to what makes slavery
uniquely wrong - the loss of control or autonomy.
This is a very promising argument, but is based on a confusion of what kind
of injustice is rectified by unjust enrichment law. Dagan's definition of
restitution is broader than others', but it still remains fundamentally tethered to
the concept of a remedy for the infringement of a right to a resource. 150 It is
not, for example, meant to compensate people for wrongful losses (that is the

145 HANOCH DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT: A STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC
VALUES 14 (1997) [hereinafter DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT] (citing Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1090, 1092, I 105-06 (1972)).
146 DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 15.
147 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 242).
Dagan thus argues that his approach fits within the spirit, if not the Jetter, of the argument
set out by Weinrib in Restitutionary Damages, supra note 69.
148 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1147-49 (explaining that
restitutionary claims may be undesirable in that they deny the absolute right of people to
control their own labor).
149
Id. (discussing the plaintiffs' loss of control over their own labor).
150 See DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 4-5 n.15 (distinguishing the
approach adopted in UNJUST ENRICHMENT from the "narrow property-based approach" of
Samuel J. Stoljar and Daniel Friedmann).

2004]

REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: ANTHONY J. SEBOK

1433

job of tort law), although sometimes tort remedies and restitution overlap. 151
The vindication of the right to control is not compensatory in the sense that the
plaintiff is compensated for pain, suffering or emotional distress, or even a
wrongful loss analogous to the dignitary harms compensated through tort
claims for false imprisonment or the violation of the right to privacy. If it
were, suits based on loss of control of a resource would really be tort suits, and
their presentation as suits in restitution would be nothing more than "clever
plead[ing]" made necessary by "technical distinctions [that] may arise in states
that take the pleading fictions seriously." 152
Dagan's answer to this objection is that restitutionary damages that exceed
the fair market value of the resource taken by the infringer are, strictly
speaking, neither compensation nor property. What are they, exactly? In the
famous case of O/well v. Nye and Nissen Co., the defendant secretly used an
egg-washing machine owned by the plaintiff. 153 The defendant profited from
the deceit because labor was expensive and the machine, left unused by the
plaintiff, was a great help to the defendant. Rather than award the rental value
of the machine (fair market value), the court forced the defendant to give back
all the money he had saved (his profits). Dagan says that disgorgement of the
profits served to "vindicate[] the plaintiffs role as the ultimate decisionmaker
with respect to the use of such resource." 154
In earlier writings, Dagan defined "vindication" as: ( 1) the remedy of a
"mischief - such as the diminution of one's well-being, or any disrespect to
one's control;" and (2) an ex ante incentive to deter wrongdoing. 155 The latter
meaning of the term is a familiar instrumentalist explanation of why profits
should be taken from conscious-wrongdoers in restitution - to deter market

151
Most of the cases that would entail a measure of recovery for loss of control would
fall under the category of waiver of tort. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d
652, 654 (Wash. 1946) (holding that because plaintiff elected "to waive his right of action in
tort and to sue in assumpsit on the implied contract," he is entitled to the restitutionary
measure of recovery (emphasis in original)). Laycock has argued that in such cases, while
the remedy is restitutionary, the substantive basis for the recovery is another department of
private law such as tort or contract. See Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of
Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (1989). Dagan, who clearly is concerned with the
substantive basis of restitution, thinks otherwise, and considers the grounds for recovery
independent of tort or contract law in cases such as Otwell. See DAGAN, UNJUST
ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 5-6.
152
Laycock, supra note 151, at 1286.
153
0/well, 173 P.2d at 652-53.
154
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at I 150.
155
DAGAN, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 145, at 9 n.28. Klimchuk takes a similar
position. Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L.
REv. 1257, 1275 (2004) ("The refusal to make restitution to slaves for unpaid wages
amounts to the claim that the value of their labour is retained by slaveholders on an adequate
legal basis.").
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bypass. 156 Dagan offers an interpretation of the instrumentalist account that
takes it outside of the welfare-maximizing rationale criticized by Radin in her
discussion of the law-and-economics rationale for penalties for rape. 157 He
observes that by disgorging the wrongdoer's profits, society expresses its
disapproval of the infringement. 158 Thus, not only does profit as a measure of
recovery promote social ends unrelated to the interests of the plaintiff, but it
actually conveys to the plaintiff an important message. It tells the plaintiff that
the infringement she suffered related not only to the market-value of the
resource at issue, but also that it takes the moral dimension of the loss of
control seriously. 159
Dagan's interpretation of the "noninstrumentalist" reason for disgorging
profits in cases like 0/well is attractive, but it cannot explain why giving the
profits gained by the infringer to the plaintiff further promotes the end of
communicating the social meaning of the restitution suit. The problem he
faces is similar to that faced by Jean Hampton in her defense of retribution. 160
Hampton argued that retribution could be a form of corrective justice because
it forced wrongdoers to repair their victims' "moral injury," not just their
economic, physical, and hedonic injuries. 161 Moral injury is not a physical
harm, nor the psychological pain that one might experience after being the
object of a moral injury. 162 It harms the victim's value in that while the
wrongdoer denies the victim's true value, her value is not being fully realized.
The diminution of the realization of the victim's value can have other harmful
consequences, but the original failure of realization is itself a wrong. Left
uncorrected, a denial of the true value of one person (and the wrongful
elevation of the value of another) may be a continuing harm because the
persistence of the false statement of value may be a reason others come to

156 See, e.g., James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1869, 1876 (2001) (discussing the deterrence rationale of Olwell); DAGAN, LAW AND
ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 236).
1 7
~ See discussion supra notes 122-138 and accompanying text.
158 DAGAN, LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 139 (manuscript at 243-44).
159 Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1151-52.
160 See JEAN HAMPTON & JEFFRIE MURPHY' FORGIVENESS AND MERCY ( 1992) [hereinafter
FORGIVENESS]; Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659 (1992) [hereinafter Correcting Harms].
16 1 Hampton's concept of moral injury is very similar to Dagan's concept of vindication
for loss of control:
A person behaves wrongfully in a way that effects a moral injury to another when she
treats that person in a way that is precluded by that person's value, and/or by
representing him as worth far less than his actual value; or, in other words, when the
meaning of her action is such that she diminishes him, and by doing so, represents
herself as elevated with respect to him, thereby according herself a value that she does
not have.
Correcting Harms, supra note 160, at 1677 (emphasis in original).
162
Id. at 1666.
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express towards the victim the false view that his value is less than equal. 163 In
fact, the "decision not to [correct the false expression of value is itself]
expressive: it communicates to the victim and to the wider society the idea that
such treatment, and the status it attributes the victim, are appropriate." 164
As in Dagan' s account of vindication of control, there may be a temptation
to convert this argument into some form of consequentialism: The reason we
punish moral injury is to deter it, and the reason we want less moral injury is
because it is associated with the infliction of physical and emotional injuries.
Hampton flatly rejected this argument. 165 What the retributivist wants to
achieve is not just (or even) that the victim feel better, but rather that the false
statement about the victim's value is 'annulled.' 166 Thus, what is required is a
response that is connected to "that which makes the wrongful act wrong." 167
What makes moral injury wrong is that it expresses a false claim about the
value of the victim. The response must express and establish not only that the
victim has value, but that the value-judgment contained in the wrongdoer's act
was wrong. For Hampton, the only way to reassert the correct moral status of
the victim is to punish the wrongdoer:
When we face actions that not merely express the message that a person
is degraded relative to the wrongdoer but also try to establish that
degradation, we are morally required to respond by trying to remake the
world in a way that denies what the wrongdoer's events have attempted
to establish, thereby lowering the wrongdoer, elevating the victim, and
annulling the act of diminishment. 168
The criticism that Hampton had to answer was why the correction of "moral
reality" had to come through the imposition of hard treatment on the
wrongdoer. Why would it not be enough for the state to announce that the
wrongdoer was, in fact, wrong about the victim's lack of moral equality? As
Hampton sarcastically put it, "why not simply hold a parade for her?" 169
Hampton's answer was that punishment of the wrongdoer compensates the
victim. 170 The wrongdoer's suffering puts the victim "back" to where she was
163

Id. at 1678.
Id. at 1684.
165 See FORGIVENESS, supra note 160, at 125.
166 Id. at 13 I.
161 Id.
164

168

Correcting Harms , supra note 160, at 1686-87 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1695.
170
Id. at 1698. As Emily Sherwin notes, the motive of retaliation seems to overlap with
the motive ofretribution in Hampton's work. A victim secures redress through moral defeat
by making the wrongdoer worse-off. See Emily L. Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust
Enrichment, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1443, 1456-57 (2004). The difference between retaliation and
retribution is not necessarily in form but in purpose. Retaliation may be motivated merely
to eliminate a wrongful gain, whereas retribution is motivated by a desire to correct a
wrongful loss.
169
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before the moral injury was inflicted.
Hampton's argument for retribution is much more complex than I have
presented it here. Whether it is ultimately persuasive is not the point of raising
it in the context of a discussion of Dagan' s argument for the vindicatory power
of restitution. It is, however, a corrective justice argument with some of the
same ambitions as Dagan's. Hampton began her analysis at a very different
point. She did not specify the measure of the penalties that would serve to
restore victims to their pre-moral injury state.171 Because, for Hampton, the
victim's moral injury was repaired through an expressive act (the public
punishment of the wrongdoer), the measure of the penalty was not necessarily
reflected in the profit gained by the wrongdoer. For Hampton, if the Otwell
case was an example of retribution in action, it was because of the expressive
defeat expressed by the loss of profit. The profit itself could not be seen as the
measure of the moral injury. Thus, even had the defendant made no profit at
all, there would still be a need to punish him, whether by punitive damages
directly, or some form of civil or criminal penalty.
Dagan's first sense of 'vindication' of interference with control seems to
parallel Hampton's understanding of retribution for moral injury. If indeed it
follows Hampton's idea, then it is much less likely to run afoul of the
commodification problem. However, if restitution of profits "vindicates"
control by expressing to the victim and the wrongdoer that the infringement is
viewed as a social offense, then the restitutionary act is the reversal of the
infringement and not the disgorgement of the profits. The disgorgement of the
profits is just a vehicle or means by which the expression of social
condemnation is communicated to the plaintiff. It should be noticed that the
profits, which "measure" recovery for loss of control, are not really a measure
at all: they are the evidence that the proper kind of notice has occurred. The
amount of money awarded is contingently determined because the amount of
profit the infringer produced is a matter of moral luck. Like Hampton's
punitive damages, the particular quantum of profit, under Dagan's account,
cannot be defended as being too much or too little, because by definition they
do not refer back to any particular resource of the plaintiff whose loss has an
objective welfare value. The practice of awarding profit damages is a legal
device designed to promote the ends or institution of restitution law without
utilizing the particular rules ofrestitution law. 172
171
According to Hampton, punitive damages could be given a non-instrumental
justification that is, as the repair of moral injury. Correcting Harms, supra note 160, at
1686 (citing M. Galanter & D. Luban, Poetic Justice: Legal Pluralism and the
Jurisprudence of Punitive Damages (1989) (unpublished manuscript), subsequently
published as Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393 (1993)).
172
In this sense, Dagan's account of profit damages in restitution law parallels not only
Hampton's account of punitive damages as private retribution but also Rawls' account of
practices like punishment or promise-keeping. Rawls noted that utilitarian justification of
these practices must take into account "the distinction between the justification of a practice

2004]

REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: ANTHONY J SEBOK

1437

According to Dagan, the restitution of wealth demanded in the slave
litigation produces only an "incomplete commodification" of the slaves' claims
because a portion of the money demanded (the profits) represents the
vindication of the entitlement to control infringed by the defendants. 173 The
invocation of Radin's terminology at this point highlights the difficulty with
Dagan's position. Radin's discussion of tort damages for emotional distress as
incompletely commodified was fraught with questions about the costs and
benefits of using market rhetoric to capture incommensurable interests, such as
the interest to be free of pain. 174 Like Hampton, Radin viewed the practice of
awarding a quantum of compensation in order to rectify a non-quantifiable
harm as controversial and in need of justification. Dagan, too, has a
justification, but his is on slightly less secure ground in the context of using the
language of restitution to provide redress for the nonmonetizable injuries of
slavery.
Like non-economic injuries or punitive damages, the primary argument for
having them, notwithstanding the dangers of commodification is that a system
of monetized damage awards is the only way to deliver to the plaintiff the
expressive or symbolic content contained in the non-commodified portion of
the award. Money for pain and suffering and punitive damages is typically
justified instrumentally. Radin and Hampton understood the non-commodified
portion of these awards not just non-instrumentally, but expressively. Radin
quoted Louis Jaffe, who suggested that pain and suffering damages were a
solatium, a payment that "signif[ies] society's sincerity." 175
Hampton
understood the moral defeat suffered by a defendant who suffered retribution
as an act that expressed to the plaintiff a specific belief about the plaintiffs
"real" moral status. Each of these damages practices work (if they work)
because they communicate to the plaintiff a belief about the plaintiff. This is
how vindication works within Dagan's model of restitution as well, but can
this model of damages work if the original subjects of the wrong are dead?
The point of this question is not to challenge the logical possibility that
and the justification of a particular action falling under it." JOHN RAWLS, Two CONCEPTS OF
RULES (1955), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS 3, 31 (1999). Dagan believes that the
practice of restitution is characterized by certain principles, such as the rectification of the
infringement of an entitlement. Where the injury to the infringement is incalculable, the
proper response is not to abandon the practice of restitution but to reinterpret its practice and
to justify the reinterpretation "by reference to the practice." RAWLS, supra at 42.
173
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1151-52 (citing CONTESTED
COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 184-91 ).
174
CONTESTED COMMODITIES, supra note 122, at 203 . Radin noted that Richard Abel, a
progressive torts scholar, recommended doing away with pain and suffering damages
because they "'commodify our unique experience."' Id. at 203 (quoting Richard Abel, A
Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REv. 785, 804-06 (1990)).
175
Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56, 71
(1993) (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219,224 (1953)).
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expressive or symbolic damages can be carried forward by survival actions.
The old rule of actio persona/is, in which an action in tort dies with the estate,
has been modified by statute in almost all fifty states. 176 The question, as
Dagan himself recognizes, is whether the doctrine of restitution, which has not
been affected by statutory modifications of tort law, should be interpreted by
the courts to extend to heirs a form of remedy not recognized by common law
tort_ 111
When an heir inherits an estate's actions maintained by a state's
survivorship laws, she is suing in the name of the victim of the tort. 178 This is
in contrast to wrongful death, where a legislatively designated member of the
decedent's family sues for damages in her own name. 179 The instrumentalist
reasons for survivorship statutes are easy to see. From a perspective of
deterrence, there would be no way to ensure that the full cost of tortious
conduct would be internalized if some of the costs of that activity were not
charged to the tortfeasor because his victims died as a result of his acts. There
may be other instrumentalist reasons relating to the inadequacy of other forms
of support for the heirs, or the inadequacy of wrongful death as a source of
compensation, that may justify the survivorship of claims.
The non-instrumentalist reasons for permitting tort claims to survive the
death of the plaintiff are rarely articulated. As one author put it, the issue with
a "survival statute ... is making the decedent's estate whole, not whether the
decedent's relatives are entitled to any benefit." 180 Why should the decedent's
estate be made whole, if not for the interest of others in receiving the money
the decedent was to receive from the defendant? It is precisely because of the
suspicion that the interests of heirs are served by survivorship that most states

176
See DAN B. DOBBS, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS§ 295 (2001) [hereinafter LAW OF TORTS II];
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 52, § 126; Wex s. Malone, The Genesis of
Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1043, 1051 (1965). Virtually all states provide for the
continuation of tort actions after the death of party who would otherwise have a valid cause
of action. See infra note I 85.
177
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1160-61.
178
See LAW OF TORTS II, supra note 176, § 295 (discussing damages under and the scope
of survival actions). "In contrast to the wrongful death action, the survival action ... merely
reverses the common law rule that a cause of action abates with the death of either party."
Id. at 805.
179
This often includes loss of the cost of burial and the value of the decedent's future
estate to the family, as well as the loss of future earnings, the loss of future services, and
sometimes compensation for the family member's emotional distress. See, e.g., Lorenz v.
Air Ill., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 1352, 1357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (listing standard jury instructions
on loss of estate); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3(a) (McKinney 2004) (allowing
recovery for burial expenses); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02(b)(5) (West 2004)
(allowing recovery for mental anguish).
180
Eric W. Gunderson, Personal Injury Damages Under the Maryland Survival Statute:
Advocating Damage Recovery for a Decedent's Future Lost Earnings, 29 U. BALT. L. REv.
97, 104 (2001).

2004)

REPARATIONS SYMPOSIUM: ANTHONY J SEBOK

1439

do not allow future earnings expectancy to be awarded through survivorship,
on the theory that heirs should (and will) receive a share of the decedent's
expected earnings through their wrongful death claim.181 Where the decedent
has no heirs who can collect under a wrongful death action, the risk of doublerecovery is eliminated, but the question remains: Other than deterring the
defendant, what is the point of allowing recovery? In one case where a court
allowed future economic Joss to be included in a survivorship claim even
where there are no heirs who would qualify to collect under a wrongful death
claim, the court argued that there where other parties with interests in the
decedent's estate being made whole, namely, "creditors and heirs or devisees"
not recognized by the wrongful death statute.182 As the Ohio Supreme Court
noted in its decision rejecting prospective income from survivorship, the
legislative decision to abandon the common law rule of actio persona/is was
designed to repair the estate of the decedent by forcing the defendant to pay
compensation for the "immediate" or "temporal" injury suffered by the
decedent before he died. 's3
The major category of damages that is maintained by survivorship rules is
pain and suffering prior to death. 184 As Dobbs notes, suits for "dignitary torts"
such as defamation, malicious prosecution, and the right to publicity often do
not survive death. 185 It is worth considering why, when state legislatures
181
See Flowers v. Marshall, 494 P.2d 1184 (Kan. 1972); James 0 . Pearson, Jr.,
Annotation, Recovery, in Action for Benefit of Decedent's Estate in Jurisdiction Which Has
Both Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes, of Value of Earnings Decedent Would Have
Made After Death, 76 A.L.R. 3d 125 (Cum. Supp. 1997).
182
Criscuola v. Andrews, 507 P.2d 149, 151 (Wash. 1973).
183
See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 848 (Fla. 1955).
184
See LAW OF TORTS II, supra note 176, § 295. "Damages in the survival action are
often quite limited in amount. They reflect only the damages the decedent herself could
have claimed at the moment of her death." Id. Lost earnings post-injury and prior to death
are a logical possibility but arise more infrequently than pain and suffering and medical
expenses post-injury. As noted, lost future injuries post-death are not often allowed.
185
Id. A substantial number of state survival statutes still do not empower a deceased's
estate to bring a cause of action for a dignitary tort such as libel, slander, false
imprisonment, malicious prosecution, privacy, or permit punitive damages to be awarded.
See, e.g., Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 1394, 1399 (D. Utah, 1997) (holding that,
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-12 (1977), claims of injuries to rights, reputation, or
property do not survive death); Conly v. Conly, 121 Mass. 550, 550 (1877) (holding that
actions for malicious prosecution do not survive under the Massachusetts common law);
Walters v. Nettleton, 59 Mass. 544, 544 (1850) (holding that actions for libel to not survive
death under the Massachusetts common law); ALA. CODE § 6-5-462 (2004) (excluding
claims based on injury to reputation); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.570 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding
defamation); ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 14-3110 (2004) (excluding "breach of promise to marry,
seduction, libel, slander, separate maintenance, alimony, loss of consortium, and invasion of
right of privacy"); ARK. CODE. ANN.§ 16-62-I0l(a)(2) (Mitchie 2003) (excluding slander
and libel); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-20-101 (2003) (excluding actions for libel and slander);
HAW. REv. STAT.§ 663-7 (2003) (excluding defamation and malicious prosecution); IDAHO
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decided to extend tort actions past death, they often decided not to include
dignitary damages such as reputation. 186 Another way of framing the question
is: Why have legislatures so often excluded dignitary injuries from the
category of "temporal" harm? From an instrumental perspective, one could
see certain social benefits to forcing wrongdoers to compensate for the injuries
resulting from dignitary wrongs; one would hope that such wrongdoing would
be discouraged.
One explanation for the hesitancy to include dignitary harms in the category
of temporal harms is that, despite the instrumental benefits of deterrence and
compensation that come with any form of damage award associated with
antisocial conduct, there is a certain conceptual incoherence to the idea of
symbolic or expressive redress for nonmonetizable interests when the party
who is repaired is an "estate" instead of the natural person whose dignity was
injured. If the purpose of using monetized damages is to (however
incompletely) communicate to the victim that the wrong they have suffered has
been identified and corrected, then the point of this interpretation of the
practice of awarding damages seems lost when the victim is dead. Of course,
if one took the viewpoint that any type of injury that is compensable through
private law is a commodity, then the death of the victim after the wrong
occurred but before the remedy could be provided is irrelevant. Our common
law takes this view with regard to property and contract but not with regard to
tort. The son of a man who was owed money because he was not paid for his
labor should be able to press that claim in quantum meruit after his father's
CODE § 5-327 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding slander and libel); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-6
(2004) (excluding slander and libel); IND. CODE § 34-9-3-l(a) (2004) (excluding libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, and personal
injuries to the deceased party); KY. REv. STAT. ANN . § 41 l.140 (Mitchie 2004) (excluding
slander, libel, criminal conversion, and malicious prosecution pertaining to the personal
injury); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 228, § 1 (2004) (providing for survival of certain actions, but
maintaining the common law exceptions of malicious prosecution and libel); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-1402 (2003) (excluding libel, slander, malicious prosecution, assault, assault and
battery, and nuisance); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 556:15 (2003) (excluding actions for
recovery of penalties and forfeitures of money under penal statutes); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
28A-18-l(b) (2004) (excluding libel, slander (with the exception of slander of title), and
false imprisonment); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 28-01-26.1 (2003) (excluding breach of promise,
alienation of affections, libel, and slander); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-102 (2004) (excluding
actions for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff); VT. STAT. ANN . tit. 14, § 1452
(2004) (providing for survivorship of actions to damages for "bodily hurt or injury"). Some
courts have abolished limitations on the survivorship of tort claims because they treat some
tort victims unequally compared to others. See Moyer v. Phillips, 341 A.2d 441, 408 (Pa.
1975) (holding that exclusion of survivorship for defamation claims under Pennsylvania
survivorship statute was unconstitutional); Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400,
407 (Minn. 1982) (holding that exclusion of survivorship for claims of intentional tort was
unconstitutional).
186
See generally Luke Degrand, Challenging the Exclusion of Libel and Slander from
Survival Statutes, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 423 , 426 (1984).
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death, assuming that all other statute of limitations questions were not at issue.
The son, however, does not automatically inherit his father's claims in tort, as
if they were property to be handed down. Any right to a remedy relating to his
father's money that he might have inherited or been given would be grounded
not on the son inheriting the father's tort claim, but on the son gaining a tort
claim of his own as a result of his father's death (e.g. under his state's
wrongful death statute).
The structure of private law suggests remedies that redress commodifiable
losses can be passed between generations somewhat easily, while remedies that
redress noncommodifiable interests can pass between generations only as the
result of some considered effort, usually involving legislation. 187 This is not an
argument in itself for denying that the original slaves had claims in restitution,
or that if they had been in possession of such claims, those claims could in
theory descend to their children and their children's children, subject to the
constraints of the applicable rules of statutes of limitations. It also is not an
argument against the claim that if the slaves had brought a suit in restitution,
their damages would have included profits. It is an argument about how we
should interpret the reason why the slaves would have had a claim in
restitution. If the reason is, as Dagan has argued, that the claim in restitution
was to rectify the loss of control by means of awarding symbolic damages,
then we are faced with a dilemma. One the one hand, we can accept Dagan's
characterization of the rationale for the restitution of profits. The problem with
doing so is that we would then be forced to permit the descent of symbolic
damages without statutory authority, with the full knowledge that they would
not even be able to achieve the ends that provide the rationale for having
incompletely commodified remedies. In the alternative, we could refuse to
allow the claims to be inherited, not just because of concerns with statutes of
limitations, but because we feel the risk of comodification is too large. Dagan
acknowledges that the second choice might be preferable on the balance of
policy reasons. 188
CONCLUSION

In this article I have argued that lawyers should be discouraged from
adopting the categories and language of restitution to address the wrongs of
slavery. My view is not that the wrongs of slavery cannot be addressed in the
language of private law. American slavery can be analyzed through the lens of

187
The descendability of claims for the "temporal injury" of pain and suffering is
explicable partly because it is the result of a legislative act. Pain and suffering damages,
which cannot ever truly repair what a victim has lost, are already monetized for a variety of
reasons by the tort system, as Radin noted. See supra notes 122- I 37 and accompanying text.
The decision to fully commodify them by making them part of an estate's "interest" in a
survivorship action only underscores the extent to which the commodification of certain
non-monetizable injuries is a step that requires careful justification.
188
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery, supra note 90, at 1163-64.
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tort law, although it has its own perils, and once the question of legal redress is
properly framed, the correct answer to the correct question will disappoint and
frustrate those who seek justice in the courts. The purpose of this article is to
suggest that the language of tort law should be adequate for a complete
analysis of the compensation of the dignitary injuries caused by slavery. 189
My argument against adopting the language of restitution is partially a
matter of comparative institutional competence - tort law can make more sense
of the real non-commodified injury at the root of the slave litigation - and
partially a matter of guesswork about the unanticipated consequences of
changing the language of restitution. The real question is not whether claims
for unjust enrichment have taken into account conduct that, as Dagan has
argued, interferes with the interest in the control of oneself. It clearly has. The
question the slavery cases raise is whether lawyers should choose to treat an
injury to this interest as a contingent or essential feature of the plaintiffs' rights
to restitution. To the extent that lawyers are encouraged to do this because
they find tort law unsatisfactory due to technical or practical issues, the flight
to restitution to avoid these problems will not provide a more stable or safer
haven.

189 For this reason, Hylton's article in this symposium offers a very thoughtful
reconsideration of the interests injured as a result of slavery and the potential for framing
new claims for redress under the existing common law of tort. See generally Hylton, supra
note 71.

